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Data on GDP per capita and sulfur emissions for twelve European countries were analyzed to 
determine the relationship between emissions and income in these countries. As a whole, the 
relationship between sulfur emissions and per capita income is a fourth order polynomial and 
not a quadratic one as found in most studies. When countries were examined individually, 
seven out of the twelve countries depicted the same relationship. Looking closely at the 
regulations restricting sulfur emissions in the UK, the impact of all regulations supported the 
inverted U-shaped Kuznets curve.  Individually, however, it is found that only two regulations 
have statistically significant impacts: Smoke Abatement Act in 1926 (reduced the amount of 
sulfur associated with a given level of GDP); and Clean Air Act in 1956 (increased the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper the following work is reported: 
 
A.  Data were collected on GDP and GDP per capita going back to 1850 for selected 
European Countries. Data were also collected on sulfur emissions for the same period and 
for the same countries. The data were analyzed to see what long term relationships could 
be ascertained between the emissions and economic output and growth. 
 
B.  Econometric analyses were employed to test the hypothesis that the environmental 
Kuznets curve exists in the selected European countries. Furthermore, the empirical 
analyses allow us: to obtain a point estimate of the impact of income on sulfur emissions, 
and regulations on income; and to determine whether the impacts are significant 
statistically.  The particularly steps taken are:  
1.  Panel regressions of sulfur emissions against GDP and higher order terms of GDP. 
 
2.  Separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations for each of the 12 countries.  
 
3.  Using only the UK data, regression of sulfur emissions against GDP and higher order 
terms of GDP, as well as dummies for years in which new regulations were passed to 
restrict sulfur emissions. Also, the effect of regulations on per capita income was 
empirically analyzed. 
 
The paper reports on the results of this work.  Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 describes 
the relationships between emissions and GDP, and Section 4 reports on the environmental 
legislation relating to sulfur and its possible impacts on GDP.  Section 5 shows the results of 
econometric analysis on the relationships among per capita income, sulfur emissions and 
regulations.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
Annex 1 provides the raw data and list of air regulations. Annex 2 provides the graphs. 
 
 
2.  The Data 
 
2.1  Per capita Gross Domestic Product (1820, 1850, 1870-2001) 
 
The per capita GDP data of the European countries were gathered from Angus Maddison’s web 
page at http://www.eco.rug.nl/~Maddison/.  Income is measured in 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars
1.  In some cases, gaps in the GDP estimates are filled by imputation.  For 
example, per capita GDP movement in Switzerland was assumed to be parallel with that of 
Germany for 1871-1998.  Data for countries like Finland and Italy for 1850 were interpolated 
between the 1820 and 1870 estimates for these countries.  
 
                                                 
1 Or purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars   3
2.2  Sulfur Emissions (1850 to 1999) 
 
The sulfur emissions data for the European countries were obtained from David Stern’s web 
page at http://www.rpi.edu/~sternd/datasite.html.  Sulfur data estimates are obtained in two 
ways: (a) by compiling available data from published sources; and (b) by using a decomposition 
model, the first differences Kuznets curve model, or simple extrapolation of the growth rate of 
emissions to impute unavailable data. The primary source for the data between 1850 and 1979 is 
the ASL and Associates database; while the data between 1980 and 1999 were primarily 
obtained from the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range 
Transmission of Air pollutants in Europe (EMEP).  The estimates of sulfur emissions have a 
common unit of thousands of metric tons per annum.  A more detailed description about the data 
and estimation methods can be found in David Stern’s website
2. 
 
For the broader purposes of this study, sulfur is used as a proxy for environmental pollution.  The 
intent is to see how emissions of a major pollutant respond to regulations and how emissions are 
related to GDP.   Although one would not expect exactly the same effects for other pollutants, 
the general lessons learnt from this analysis can be expected to apply more broadly. 
 
The GDP and sulfur data are given in Annex One for the following 12 countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom.  
 
The per capita GDP from 1820 to 2001 are given in Annex Table 1, which is a remarkable 
dataset, assembled with great effort and care by Angus Maddison.  It shows that the per capita 
GDP terms, which is a measure of economic living standards, rose by an average of 15.7 times 
over these 181 years, with a minimum of 11.8 for the UK and 25.2 for Finland (the UK was 
already quite industrialized in 1820 and Finland was largely agricultural at that time).  The 
average annual growth rate for the 12 countries is 1.5 percent and the rates are much more 
closely bunched than the ratios of 2001 to 1820 per capita GDP.  The lowest rate is 1.4 percent 
(UK) and the highest is 1.8 percent (Finland). 
 
The sulfur emissions data are given from 1850 to 1999 in Annex Table 2.  Unlike the GDP data, 
they do not show a general upward trend, but rather an increase up to a certain year and then 
decline.  The year of maximum emissions varies, but for 9 of the countries it is in the period 
1970-1985.  For the UK it was 1955, for Switzerland, 1939 and for Austria, 1908.  The growth in 
emissions over the whole period is small in most countries and even negative in the case of the 
UK – i.e., the emissions of sulfur in 1999 in that country were less than in 1850! 
 
From this, one can see that emissions and GDP are not positively related over the whole period.  
In the next section we will look at the relationship in more detail. 
 
                                                 
2 http://www.rpi.edu/~sternd/Sulfur.pdf   4
 
3.  Relationships Between Per Capita GDP and Sulfur. 
 
Figures A1 to A12 in Annex Two show the sharp disjuncture in the relationship by country.  
Essentially after the Second World War per capita GDP started to grow quite sharply but sulfur 
emissions, which hitherto had grown faster than this measure of GDP, started to grow more 
slowly and eventually to decline.  The pattern is related in each country, with the most 
pronounced declines post 1970s (with the exception of Switzerland the UK, where the decline 
began much earlier. 
 
Figures B1 to B12 plot the real per capita GDP against the level of sulfur emissions. As 
expected, the relationship shows something of an “inverted U”.  Emissions rise against per 
capita GDP to some point, after which as the GDP increases, emissions tail off.  This is of course 
the well-known ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’ relationship but we should be careful.  All the 
graphs show more than one turning point, suggesting a higher order polynomial as being 
appropriate.  Further work using econometric techniques will be needed to analyze this 
relationship. 
 
Figures C1 to C12 plot the annual rates of growth of sulfur and real per capita GDP.  The graphs 
are interesting in showing a short-term correlation (i.e., year on year growth in GDP correlates 
with year on year growth in sulfur).  However, since the 1950s, the relationship has weakened 
and diverted in terms of levels.  While it is still true that the annual growth rates are correlated, 
and a year when GDP per capita growth increases is also one when sulfur growth increases, the 
latter is from a much lower base growth rate – often from a negative growth rate. 
 
Figures D1 to D12 plot the Percentage growth in sulfur emissions against the percentage growth 
in per capita GDP.  The purpose here is to show a lack of clear relationship.  The points are to 
found predominantly in the positive sulfur growth/positive GDP per capita growth and negative 
sulfur growth/positive GDP per capita growth.  In Figure E1 we show, for the United Kingdom, 
the points pre 1957 and post 1957 in different colors.  We do that to show that the post 1957 
points are mainly in the negative sulfur growth/positive GDP per capita growth quadrant. 
 
 
4.  Impact of Environmental Legislation on Sulfur. 
 
Annex Table 3 gives the key dates of legislation that could have impacted on sulfur emissions in 
the UK from 1820 onwards and Annex Table 4 gives the same (but less complete) information 
for other European countries.  The UK legislation is most instructive in showing that attempts to 
control sulfur emissions go back to 1821 -- almost as far back as the records for GDP.  Indeed 
there were measures earlier than that – in the 13
th Century for example - but they are not 
recorded here, as our GDP series do not go back that far. 
 
The interesting question is how these Acts have affected the sulfur-GDP relationship.  Figure E2 
in Annex Two is plotted for the UK but with the dates of some of the key Acts shown.  The most 
pronounced decline in emissions took place in 1926, following the smoke abatement act, but this 
was only a temporary drop returned to more or less the same levels after that.  Years of the Acts   5
from 1956 onwards show a steady decline in emissions but no sudden jump in the per capita 
GDP series.  We can conclude from this that the controls on sulfur have made a major 
contribution to reducing this pollutant, but have not made a major dent in the growth of real 
living standards. 
 
This analysis is interesting and very instructive about long-term relationships. The lesson for the 
carbon debate is that it is possible to reduce emissions of a key byproduct of a modern economy, 
without sacrificing long-term growth.  The analysis can and should be sharpened with 
econometric work to see when, and to what extent, the legislation has influenced GDP and GDP 
growth, as presented in the subsequent sections. 
 
 
5.  Econometric model and results 
 
5.1 All Countries 
 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for per capita GDP and per capita sulfur emissions for the 
12 countries individually and for them as a group. Using the information from all countries, the 
panel data estimation technique is used to deal with inter-country heterogeneity in the analysis. 
An attractive facet of panel data is the creation of more variability by combining variation across 
countries with variation over time thus alleviating multi-collinearity problems and providing a 
more efficient estimation (Kennedy, 2000). Several other advantages of using the panel data are 
mentioned in the literature. 
 
There are two panel data estimations: fixed effects and random effects. The fixed effects 
estimator allows the intercept to differ across the cross-section units by estimating different 
constants for each cross-section.  The random effects model also assumes a different intercept for 
each cross-section, but the intercepts are interpreted in a different manner.  This model considers 
the intercepts as having been drawn from a ‘bowl’ of possible intercepts. Consequently, these 
intercepts may be taken as random and treated as if they were part of the error term. As a result, 
the specification has an overall intercept, a set of explanatory variables with their respective 
coefficients, and a composite error term. The composite error has two parts: a random intercept 
term and the traditional random error (Kennedy, 2000).  To determine which estimation method 
is appropriate given the available information, we begin by testing the null hypothesis that the 
intercepts are equal. If the null is accepted, the data are pooled and Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) is the appropriate estimation method to employ.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, a 
Hausman test is applied to test if the random effects estimator is unbiased – this means that there 
is no correlation between the composite error and the regressor.  If the null is accepted, the 
random effects estimator is used; if the null is rejected, the fixed effects estimator is used.   
 
Most studies model the emissions as a quadratic or cubic function of per capita income.   
However, this paper establishes the model based on the general distribution of the raw data. 
Figure 1 shows the plot of per capita income against per capita sulfur emissions in all of the 
twelve countries. 
   6
The appropriate order of the function is not very clear from visually inspecting the data; hence, 
country-level emissions were modeled in two ways: as a quadratic function of per capita income, 
and as a 4
th order polynomial function of per capita income.    Equations 1 and 2 give the two 
specifications. These will be compared later to determine which one is a better fit for the data. 
 
it it it i k i j it GDPPC GDPPC TS CS SULFURPC ε β β δ φ β + + + + + =
2
3 2 0               (Eq. 1) 
 
it it it
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µ θ θ
θ θ σ ϕ θ
+ + +






4 3 0                            (Eq. 2) 
 
where  CSi  - country dummy variable  
  TSi – time dummy variable 
i – country = Austria, …, UK 
t – year = 1870, 1871, …, 1999 
 
Note that other studies use only a dummy variable for time.  However, this paper also included a 
dummy variable for each country in order to deal with the heterogeneity across countries.   
 
Equations 1 and 2 were run and an F-test was performed on the country and time dummy 
variables to determine whether a pooled or panel regression is appropriate. The F-test rejects the 
null hypothesis of homogeneity across each country and each time period, which indicates that 
OLS is not applicable but panel data estimation via fixed effects or random effects. Then, the 
Hausman test was employed to test the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the 
composite error and explanatory variables.  Under the null hypothesis, the random effects model 
is applicable.  The Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis, which means that the fixed effects 
model is appropriate.  Therefore, only the fixed coefficient estimates are provided (Table 2).   
 
Furthermore, the White Test was performed to test for heteroskedasticity.  The null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity was rejected, which means that even if the estimators remain unbiased, their 
significance is no longer reliable because the variance is biased.  Therefore, a White 
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator was used in the fixed effects model to 
generate standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
Based on the adjusted R-squared, the per capita emissions as a 4
th order polynomial function of 
per capita income (Eq. 2) is a better fit for the available data on the 12 European countries.  
Figure 2 plots the predicted dependent variable against per capita income.3  
 
 
5.2 Individual countries 
 
Individual regressions were performed on each country to closely examine the environmental 
Kuznet’s curve evidence at the country level.  The model specifications used are the following: 
 
                                                 
3 The predicted dependent variable was derived by using the intercept and slope coefficients only.   7
it it it it GDPPC GDPPC SULFURPC ε β β α + + + =
2
2 1       ( E q .   3 )  
 






2 1  (Eq.  4) 
 
Ordinary Least Squares was used to estimate the above equations.  Table 3 shows the summary 
of country-level coefficient estimates.  The choice of the model for a given country was based on 
the following criteria: (a) comparing the relative magnitude of adjusted R-squared; and (b) 
testing the null hypothesis that the third and fourth order income terms are insignificantly 
different from zero. For 4 countries (Finland, Germany, Italy and Netherlands), Equation 3 was 
employed because: (a) its adjusted R-squared is higher relative to Equation 4; and (b) F-test on 
the 3
rd and 4
th order income variables are insignificantly different from zero at 10% level.  
 
 
5.3 United Kingdom data and air regulations 
There is available information for United Kingdom on regulations focusing on air quality (see 
Annex Tables 3 and 4 for details). These regulations have a component targeted to reduce sulfur 
emissions, hence they were introduced as explanatory variables in the estimation to determine 
empirically their impact on sulfur emissions in the UK.  The model specifications explored are 
those that capture the short-term effects of the regulation (Eq. 5) and the long run effects of the 
regulation (Eq. 6): 
 






2 1   (Eq. 5) 
 
where ARt – dummy variable for the t period when a particular air regulation was implemented; 
ARt = 1 if t; zero otherwise   
t – year = 1874, 1926, 1956, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, …. 
 






2 1 0   (Eq. 6) 
 
where ARt – dummy variable; To represent the long-term effect of an implemented an air 
regulation, a dummy variable is introduced, where a value of “1” is assigned for the 
starting year of the regulation and the years after that; and “zero” otherwise. 
 
t – start year = 1874, 1926, 1956, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, …. 
 
Table 4 shows the regression results from Equation 5 and Equation 6.  The coefficient estimates 
of per capita GDP variables from both equations are statistically significant at 1%.   
 
 
Each dummy variable in Equation 5 was introduced to capture any short-term effect of a 
particular air regulation. This means that the effect of air regulation on sulfur emissions is 
experienced only in the year it was implemented. Regression results show that only 2 of the 
dummy variables have coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at 10% level of 
significance.  These are for the air regulation implemented in 1926 and 1956.  In contrast, the 
dummy variables in Equation 6 intend to capture any long-term effect of a particular air   8
regulation, i.e., the regulation’s impact is experienced on the year it was implemented and on the 
succeeding years. Regression results show that only 1 out of the 17 dummy variables have 
coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at 1% level of significance.  This is for 
the air regulation implemented in 1926.    
 
An F-test on the statistically insignificant coefficient estimates was performed to test the null 
hypothesis that the joint effect of the corresponding variables is insignificantly different from 
zero
4. For both equations, the test result rejected the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance.  
This means that although each variable has insignificant individual effects, the said variables 
have a collective significant effect on the dependent variable (sulfur emissions).  Furthermore, 
results from both equations accept the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis – that there is an 
inverted U-shape relationship between an environmental degradation indicator (e.g., sulfur 
emission) and per capita income. 
 
 
5.4 Effect of Regulation on the Per Capita Income 
 
The above analysis looks at how the sulfur regulations affected the environmental Kuznets curve 
and finds that, in general, the effects have been small with most regulations not having any 
effects on the sulfur/GDP relationship, but one (1926) reducing the amount of sulfur associated 
with a given level of GDP and one (1956) increasing the amount of sulfur associated with a 
given level of GDP.  In neither case, however, has the direct relationship between GDP and the 
regulation been examined.  This is done in below, where the short-term and long-term effects of 
the regulations on the per capita GDP growth of United Kingdom are estimated. The difference 
between short-term and long-term effects is provided by the assignment of dummy variables. 
The general model is as follows: 
 




2 1 0 _       ( E q .   7 )  
where  t – trend variable
5 
ARj – dummy variable for the j period when a particular air regulation was 
implemented 
 
For the short-term effect:  
ARj = 1 if j; zero otherwise   
j – year = 1874, 1926, 1956, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, …. 
This means that the effect of air regulation on sulfur emissions is experienced only in the year it 
was implemented. 
 
For the long-term effect:  
ARj – 1 is assigned for the starting year of the regulation and the years after that; and “zero” 
otherwise. 
j – start year = 1874, 1926, 1956, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, …. 
                                                 
4 From Eq. 5, Ho:  0 ˆ ... ˆ ˆ
17 4 1 = = = = θ θ θ ; from Eq. 6, Ho:  0 ˆ ... ˆ ˆ
17 3 1 = = = = θ θ θ  
5 Higher order trend variables (e.g., t
4, t
5, …) were found to be statistically insignificant.    9
This infers that the regulation’s impact is experienced from the year it was implemented and 
carried over the succeeding years. 
 
A check for the appropriate functional form, through Box-Cox regression, was conducted.  This 
is done to find out if a linear or a semi-log functional form is more appropriate to examine the 
model described above.  The null hypothesis of linearity (supporting a linear form) was accepted 
at 5% level of significance.  Table 5 presents the regression results that capture the regulations’ 




The model that incorporates the long-term effects of the regulations appears to be a better fit for 
the available data based on the R-squared and Adjusted R-squared values, which are both higher 
relative to those of the model with short-term regulation effects. The trend variable in this model 
infers a sustained upward or downward movement in the behavior of per capita GDP. Results 
show that over the period 1870 to 1999, on average, the per capita GDP increased at the absolute 
rate of about 71 GK$ per annum.  Therefore, over the said period, there was an upward trend in 
per capita GDP.  Now, looking at the regulation variables, the regulations that were implemented 
on 1980 and 1990 have a significant long-term negative impact on per capita GDP; while those 
that were implemented on 1985 and 1988 have a significant long-term positive impact.   
 
It must be noted that interpreting the results in Table 5 should be treated with utmost caution 
because other variables that have significant influence on per capita GDP were not included in 
the estimation due to unavailability; for example, capital share, labor share, total factor 
productivity, etc. By not including these variables, the coefficient estimates are biased.   
Furthermore, there are other variables that may serve as proxy to environmental regulation such 
as government expenditures for pollution abatement and control. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This report has the following results: 
 
6.1  For the 12 European countries as a whole, the appropriate relationship between per capita 
sulfur emissions and GDP is a fourth order polynomial and not a quadratic one. The best 
fit equation implies that  
 
a.  the fixed effects regression has a better fit than the random effects regression. With 
fixed effects, the intercept terms for each country are allowed to vary implying that 
the per capita sulfur emissions–GDP per capita relationship will differ from country 
to country by a shift factor;   
b.  the ‘turning point for the sulfur-GDP relationship is much lower than previously 
thought – around $7,000 and not $15,000; and 
c.  there is second turning point at a much higher income level – about $25,000, but with 
lower sulfur emissions. 
                                                 
6 Regression results for the semi-log model are presented in the Appendix.   10
 
6.2  The individual country regressions support a fourth order polynomial for all the countries 
except Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Of these five, there is no 
relationship for Austria and for the other four, the relationship is a quadratic one.  For the 
countries where there is a quadratic fit the turning point is between approximately 
$10,000 and $14,000; whereas for the countries with a fourth order fit, the turning point 
is between about $5,000 and $10,000.      
 
6.3  For the UK, an analysis was carried out to see if regulations limiting sulfur emissions had 
an impact on the relationship between sulfur and GDP.  Individually only two regulations 
had any impact – the one in 1926 reduced the amount of sulfur associated with a given 
level of GDP and one in 1956 increased the amount of sulfur associated with a given 
level of GDP.  The other regulations did not have any impact although as a group all the 
regulations did shift the Kuznets curve down. 
 
6.4  An attempt was made to see if there was any direct relationship between GDP and the 
sulfur regulations.  The simple trend analysis showed no impact for most regulations. The 
regulations that were implemented on 1980 and 1990 have a significant long-term 
negative impact on per capita GDP; while those that were implemented on 1985 and 1988 
have a significant long-term positive impact. These results should be treated with utmost 
caution because other variables that have significant influence on per capita GDP were 
not included in the estimation. Excluding these variables in the estimation will yield 
biased coefficient estimates.  Also, there are other variables that may serve as proxy to 
environmental regulation; for example, pollution abatement and control expenditures by 
the government.   
 
6.5  In general, the regression results support the view that a sharp decline in sulfur emissions 
in the latter part of the 20
th century was consistent with continued growth in GDP, and the 
individual regulations limiting emissions did not have a major impact on the growth of 
GDP. 
 
6.6  It is difficult to see why some countries show fourth order relationship without 
undertaking some further work. In some countries sulfur emissions declined earlier while 
GDP continued to grow, and then, there was a second phase of growth when emissions 
started to rise again.  This needs further investigation. Also, further work is needed in 
terms of investigating the reasons why some air regulations have negative impacts on 
GDP. A closer examination of the institutional changes, technological changes and 
political economy changes that occurred over the years in the focus countries may be 
warranted.  
   11
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Per capita GDP  Per capita sulfur  Countries 
Mean  Std 
dev 
Max  Min  Mean  Std 
dev 
Max  Min 
All  12  countries  7,192 5,897  31,773 1,110 0.023 0.019 0.134 0.001
Austria  6,105 5,161  19,608 1,725 0.037 0.027 0.134 0.003
Belgium  7,031 4,897  19,978 2,682 0.029 0.009 0.049 0.009
Denmark  7,599 5,807  22,417 1,993 0.020 0.009 0.044 0.004
Finland  5,458 5,158  19,058 1,110 0.016 0.016 0.061 0.001
France  6,799 5,549  20,269 1,876 0.018 0.007 0.030 0.006
Germany  10,139 8,648  31,773 2,217 0.036 0.011 0.051 0.005
Italy  5,615 5,121  18,432 1,467 0.013 0.009 0.038 0.003
Netherlands  7,328 5,110  20,976 2,649 0.012 0.006 0.025 0.003
Norway  6,587 6,214  23,922 1,432 0.013 0.007 0.030 0.003
Switzerland  6,940 5,529  19,652 1,664 0.014 0.007 0.031 0.003
Sweden  9,076 6,607  21,886 2,176 0.011 0.006 0.026 0.002
United 
Kingdom  7,631 4,306  19,223 3,191 0.058 0.015 0.077 0.010
Notes: Sulfur emission is measured in metric ton. 
 
 
Table 2.  Summary of coefficient estimates from Equations 1 and 2. 






3 -1 . 0 0 E - 1 3
GDPPC
4 - -1.52E-18
    
Turning point of the peak  GK$15236.33 GK$7061.001
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.65 0.69






Hausman test statistic for 
random effects (DF) 
180.22
(2)
     140.25 
    (4)
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Table 3. Summary of coefficient estimates, country level.  







Finland 1.10E-05  -5.30E-10 - - GK$10,386 
Germany 2.81E-06  -9.67E-11 - - GK$14,553 
Italy 7.31E-06  -3.61E-10 - - GK$10,125 
Netherlands 5.43E-06  -2.61E-10 - - GK$10,418 
4
th order Model 




Austria 15.2E-6  -3.5E-9 256.6E-115 -6.2E-18 GK$3,145 
Belgium 2.52E-05  -2.96E-09 1.43E-13 -2.68E-18 GK$7,894 
Denmark 2.15E-05  -2.94E-09 1.70E-13 -3.54E-18 GK$7,965 
France 1.50E-05  -1.76E-09 8.889E-14 -1.80E-18 GK$10,000 
Norway 9.08E-06  -1.45E-09 8.44E-14 -1.66E-18 GK$5,075 
Sweden 2.39E-05  -4.12E-09 2.86E-13 -6.92E-18 GK$5,439 
Switzerland 2.33E-05  -3.47E-09 1.98E-13 -3.91E-18 GK$6,089 
UK 3.71E-05  -5.05E-09 2.62E-13 -4.95E-18 GK$6,183 
 
Table 4. Regression results, impact of per capita income and air regulations  
on sulfur emissions in the United Kingdom. 
UK-Short Term  UK-Long Term  Variable 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant -4.10E+03 -6.49E+00 -1.87E-02 -1.11E+00
UK_GDPPC 2.76E+00 8.63E+00 3.05E-05 3.15E+00
UK_GDPPC
2 -3.41E-04 -6.24E+00 -2.83E-09 -1.53E+00
UK_GDPPC
3 1.69E-08 4.45E+00 5.98E-14 4.16E-01
UK_GDPPC
4 -3.08E-13 -3.39E+00 7.51E-19 1.99E-01
AR1874 -1.47E+02 -6.02E-01 1.20E-03 4.97E-01
AR1926 -1.30E+03 -5.39E+00 -1.23E-02 -7.34E+00
AR1956 4.08E+02 1.68E+00 3.11E-03 1.27E+00
AR1968 1.80E+02 7.33E-01 -4.76E-03 -1.45E+00
AR1972 -2.13E+02 -8.67E-01 -1.30E-03 -3.26E-01
AR1974 -1.61E+02 -6.58E-01 1.67E-04 4.62E-02
AR1979 4.28E+01 1.73E-01 3.42E-03 6.85E-01
AR1980 7.21E+01 2.92E-01 -4.36E-03 -9.67E-01
AR1985 -1.75E+02 -6.98E-01 4.71E-03 9.27E-01
AR1988 3.49E+02 1.35E+00 3.87E-03 6.05E-01
AR1989 3.57E+02 1.38E+00 -8.42E-04 -1.42E-01
AR1990 3.70E+02 1.43E+00 -1.63E-03 -3.37E-01
AR1993 4.48E+01 1.73E-01 -4.14E-03 -8.62E-01
AR1994 -1.55E+01 -5.92E-02 -3.95E-03 -5.99E-01
AR1995 -6.63E+01 -2.52E-01 -5.57E-03 -8.96E-01
AR1997 -1.35E+02 -4.71E-01 -9.89E-03 -1.11E+00
AR1999 -5.39E+01 -1.54E-01 -8.29E-03 -1.04E+00
R-squared 0.91  0.94 
Adjusted R-squared  0.89  0.93   14
Table 5. Regression results, impact of air regulations on per capita income. 
  Short Term Effect  Long Term Effect 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic  Prob.  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant  2987.58  22.89 1.93E-43 3129.16 18.68 9.05E-36
T  66.12  7.52 1.69E-11 74.00 4.20 5.54E-05
T2  -1.13  -7.05 1.69E-10 -1.26 -2.96 0.00
T3  0.01  14.49 3.62E-27 0.01 4.48 1.88E-05
AR1874 94.61  0.27 0.79 -268.38 -1.16 0.25
AR1926 -380.73  -1.10 0.27 31.68 0.18 0.86
AR1956 -240.09  -0.69 0.49 -34.33 -0.17 0.87
AR1968 243.25  0.70 0.48 331.71 1.44 0.15
AR1972 293.56  0.85 0.40 363.07 1.26 0.21
AR1974 413.77  1.19 0.23 -251.06 -0.88 0.38
AR1979 512.36  1.47 0.14 230.76 0.63 0.53
AR1980 17.62  0.05 0.96 -805.51 -2.19 0.03
AR1985 -144.30  -0.41 0.68 472.43 1.73 0.09
AR1988  915.34  2.59 0.01 753.97 1.97 0.05
AR1989  895.91  2.52 0.01 -17.90 -0.04 0.97
AR1990 583.04  1.63 0.11 -864.07 -2.25 0.03
AR1993 -459.92  -1.27 0.21 -486.72 -1.27 0.21
AR1994 -146.27  -0.40 0.69 314.63 0.68 0.50
AR1995 -86.42  -0.24 0.81 78.06 0.19 0.85
AR1997 141.58  0.38 0.71 257.74 0.76 0.45
AR1999 214.50  0.56 0.57 28.01 0.07 0.94
           
Trend coef. 
estimate 73.3970    70.76279   
R-squared 0.9947    0.9952   
Adjusted R-
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 Annex Table 1. Per capita GDP in 12 European countries, annual estimates 1820-2001 
(1990 "international" Geary-Khamis dollars). 
  Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy  Netherlds. Norway  Sweden Switzerl. UK 
1820 1,287 1,319 1,274 781 1,230 1,077 1,117 1,821 1,104 1,198 1,280 1,707
1850 1,650 1,847 1,767 909 1,685 1,428 1,292 2,373 1,187 1,289 1,710 2,310
1870 1,863 2,692 2,003 1,140 1,876 1,839 1,499 2,758 1,432 1,664 2,202 3,191
1871 1,979 2,682 1,993 1,127 1,899 1,817 1,506 2,734 1,445 1,684 2,176 3,345
1872 1,976 2,824 2,087 1,145 2,078 1,931 1,475 2,771 1,527 1,746 2,312 3,319
1873 1,913 2,820 2,057 1,193 1,922 1,999 1,524 2,853 1,548 1,885 2,394 3,365
1874 1,981 2,890 2,096 1,204 2,157 2,124 1,513 2,727 1,586 1,938 2,543 3,386
1875 1,973 2,861 2,112 1,211 2,219 2,112 1,550 2,880 1,615 1,835 2,529 3,434
1876 2,000 2,875 2,130 1,259 2,028 2,071 1,506 2,890 1,639 1,935 2,480 3,430
1877 2,050 2,884 2,046 1,211 2,127 2,033 1,493 2,927 1,626 1,851 2,434 3,425
1878 2,100 2,942 2,102 1,173 2,091 2,103 1,506 2,991 1,555 1,818 2,518 3,403
1879 2,068 2,945 2,149 1,167 1,953 2,029 1,514 2,778 1,554 1,769 2,430 3,353
1880 2,079 3,065 2,181 1,155 2,120 1,991 1,581 3,046 1,588 1,846 2,384 3,477
1881 2,145 3,070 2,183 1,110 2,194 2,025 1,467 3,074 1,597 1,851 2,425 3,568
1882 2,140 3,136 2,240 1,203 2,288 2,044 1,584 3,117 1,593 1,924 2,447 3,643
1883 2,209 3,145 2,299 1,230 2,288 2,143 1,568 3,305 1,588 1,937 2,566 3,643
1884 2,248 3,136 2,285 1,219 2,253 2,178 1,566 3,328 1,611 1,976 2,608 3,622
1885 2,215 3,138 2,274 1,231 2,207 2,216 1,584 3,362 1,618 1,951 2,653 3,574
1886 2,268 3,153 2,336 1,276 2,237 2,211 1,643 3,374 1,616 1,929 2,647 3,600
1887 2,404 3,250 2,395 1,276 2,249 2,275 1,678 3,467 1,624 1,926 2,724 3,713
1888 2,379 3,247 2,389 1,302 2,269 2,341 1,662 3,544 1,690 1,971 2,803 3,849
1889 2,337 3,379 2,400 1,327 2,322 2,379 1,579 3,502 1,743 2,065 2,849 4,024
1890 2,443 3,428 2,523 1,381 2,376 2,428 1,667 3,323 1,777 2,086 2,907 4,009
1891 2,506 3,395 2,555 1,350 2,432 2,397 1,651 3,224 1,778 2,105 2,870 3,975
1892 2,535 3,442 2,598 1,280 2,493 2,469 1,548 3,240 1,806 2,144 2,956 3,846
1893 2,525 3,455 2,629 1,341 2,535 2,565 1,609 3,236 1,844 2,143 3,071 3,811
1894 2,645 3,468 2,657 1,399 2,626 2,598 1,576 3,273 1,832 2,171 3,111 4,029
1895 2,688 3,512 2,770 1,492 2,569 2,686 1,592 3,334 1,827 2,257 3,216 4,118
1896 2,701 3,551 2,836 1,570 2,685 2,740 1,627 3,166 1,857 2,367 3,281 4,249
1897 2,730 3,586 2,863 1,624 2,639 2,775 1,545 3,436 1,923 2,429 3,326 4,264
1898 2,855 3,615 2,870 1,668 2,760 2,848 1,672 3,460 1,900 2,457 3,410 4,428
1899 2,886 3,656 2,952 1,607 2,911 2,905 1,700 3,465 1,927 2,491 3,511 4,567
1900 2,882 3,731 3,017 1,668 2,876 2,985 1,785 3,424 1,937 2,561 3,580 4,492
1901 2,864 3,719 3,104 1,636 2,826 2,871 1,890 3,440 1,967 2,515 3,644 4,450
1902 2,945 3,739 3,141 1,591 2,775 2,893 1,821 3,543 1,990 2,496 3,704 4,525
1903 2,941 3,772 3,290 1,686 2,831 3,008 1,893 3,562 1,971 2,669 3,761 4,440
1904 2,956 3,821 3,326 1,731 2,847 3,083 1,896 3,535 1,961 2,680 3,817 4,428
1905 3,090 3,882 3,346 1,742 2,894 3,104 1,984 3,594 1,974 2,691 3,932 4,520
1906 3,176 3,917 3,402 1,794 2,943 3,152 2,042 3,669 2,037 2,845 3,924 4,631
1907 3,338 3,932 3,486 1,834 3,070 3,245 2,254 3,622 2,104 2,885 3,976 4,679
1908 3,320 3,933 3,552 1,829 3,045 3,254 2,288 3,577 2,157 2,853 4,027 4,449
1909 3,276 3,971 3,643 1,884 3,167 3,275 2,444 3,660 2,195 2,808 4,077 4,511
1910 3,290 4,064 3,705 1,906 2,965 3,348 2,332 3,789 2,256 2,980 4,125 4,611
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Annex Table 1 (continued). Per capita GDP in 12 European countries... 
  Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy  Netherlds. Norway  Sweden Switzerl. UK 
1911 3,365 4,148 3,857 1,939 3,250 3,408 2,461 3,888 2,309 3,002 4,175 4,709
1912 3,505 4,206 3,812 2,022 3,514 3,524 2,465 3,955 2,392 3,064 4,222 4,762
1913 3,465 4,220 3,912 2,111 3,485 3,646 2,564 4,049 2,501 3,096 4,266 4,921
1914 2,876 3,923 4,110 2,001 3,236 3,059 2,543 3,868 2,530 3,048 4,233 4,927
1915 2,653 3,858 3,778 1,882 3,248 2,899 2,810 3,926 2,611 3,028 4,290 5,288
1916 2,628 4,080 3,891 1,893 3,463 2,935 3,139 3,956 2,669 2,968 4,277 5,384
1917 2,586 3,519 3,617 1,581 2,979 2,952 3,301 3,627 2,399 2,584 3,804 5,421
1918 2,555 2,861 3,459 1,370 2,396 2,983 3,392 3,352 2,286  2,532 3,798 5,459
1919 2,259 3,389 3,860 1,658 2,811 2,586 2,845 4,122 2,647 2,669 4,060 4,870
1920 2,412 3,962 3,992 1,846 3,227 2,796 2,587 4,220 2,780 2,802 4,314 4,548
1921 2,650 4,056 3,826 1,884 3,075 3,078 2,528 4,431 2,518 2,674 4,208 4,439
1922 2,877 4,413 4,166 2,058 3,610 3,331 2,631 4,599 2,784 2,906 4,618 4,637
1923 2,842 4,533 4,559 2,187 3,754 2,750 2,763 4,635 2,826 3,047 4,874 4,760
1924 3,163 4,638 4,528 2,224 4,179 3,199 2,765 4,895 2,796 3,130 5,039 4,921
1925 3,367 4,666 4,378 2,328 4,166 3,532 2,921 5,031 2,949 3,233 5,388 5,144
1926 3,413 4,784 4,598 2,392 4,249 3,605 2,926 5,358 2,996 3,404 5,626 4,936
1927 3,505 4,923 4,658 2,557 4,154 3,941 2,838 5,504 3,098 3,500 5,892 5,315
1928 3,657 5,139 4,785 2,707 4,431 4,090 3,016 5,720 3,188 3,656 6,171 5,357
1929 3,699 5,054 5,075 2,717 4,710 4,051 3,093 5,689 3,472 3,869 6,332 5,503
1930 3,586 4,979 5,341 2,666 4,532 3,973 2,918 5,603 3,712 3,937 6,246 5,441
1931 3,288 4,860 5,359 2,581 4,235 3,652 2,877 5,185 3,404 3,782 5,943 5,138
1932 2,940 4,607 5,169 2,550 3,959 3,362 2,948 5,035 3,609 3,666 5,710 5,148
1933 2,833 4,681 5,291 2,702 4,239 3,556 2,906 4,956 3,674 3,721 5,966 5,277
1934 2,852 4,624 5,402 2,988 4,192 3,858 2,894 4,805 3,771 3,991 5,952 5,608
1935 2,907 4,894 5,480 3,093 4,086 4,120 3,148 4,929 3,912 4,232 5,907 5,799
1936 2,995 4,913 5,575 3,279 4,244 4,451 3,130 5,190 4,130 4,465 5,908 6,035
1937 3,156 4,961 5,668 3,441 4,487 4,685 3,319 5,433 4,255 4,664 6,171 6,218
1938 3,559 4,832 5,762 3,589 4,466 4,994 3,316 5,250 4,337 4,725 6,390 6,266
1939 4,096 5,150 5,993 3,408 4,793 5,406 3,521 5,544 4,516 5,029 6,360 6,262
1940 3,959 4,562 5,116 3,220 4,042 5,403 3,505 4,831 4,088 4,857 6,397 6,856
1941 4,217 4,358 4,574 3,322 3,309 5,711 3,432 4,531 4,163 4,914 6,312 7,482
1942 3,983 3,997 4,629 3,327 2,981 5,740 3,369 4,107 3,976 5,179 6,107 7,639
1943 4,065 3,907 5,080 3,697 2,860 5,890 3,039 3,981 3,867 5,360 6,001 7,744
1944 4,152 4,112 5,543 3,685 2,422 6,084 2,463 2,649 3,631 5,484 6,089 7,405
1945 1,725 4,333 5,066 3,450 2,573 4,514 1,922 2,686 4,029  5,568 7,752 7,056
1946 1,956 4,574 5,777 3,683 3,855 2,217 2,502 4,457 4,409 6,102 8,181 6,745
1947 2,166 4,800 6,035 3,717 4,138 2,436 2,920 5,048 4,855 6,175 9,050 6,604
1948 2,764 5,024 6,133 3,957 4,393 2,834 3,063 5,490 5,182 6,292 9,116 6,746
1949 3,293 5,193 6,494 4,143 4,946 3,282 3,265 5,880 5,230 6,455 8,757 6,956
1950 3,706 5,462 6,946 4,253 5,270 3,881 3,502 5,996 5,463 6,738 9,064 6,907
1951 3,959 5,747 6,936 4,572 5,553 4,207 3,738 6,032 5,663 6,951 9,684 7,083
1952 3,967 5,668 6,955 4,674 5,659 4,550 3,997 6,084 5,809 6,996 9,630 7,048
1953 4,137 5,818 7,292 4,652 5,783 4,900 4,260 6,542 6,016 7,145 9,842 7,304
1954 4,555 6,029 7,371 5,001 6,020 5,242 4,449 6,906 6,253 7,403 10,287 7,574
1955 5,053 6,280 7,395 5,197 6,312 5,788 4,676 7,326 6,311 7,566 10,867 7,826
1956 5,397 6,422 7,440 5,295 6,568 6,164 4,859 7,499 6,577 7,797 11,439 7,891
1957 5,716 6,495 7,965 5,490 6,890 6,482 5,118 7,614 6,706 8,089 11,705 7,982  19
Annex Table 1  (continued). Per capita GDP in 12 European countries... 
  Austria  Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy  Netherlds. Norway Sweden Switzerl. UK 
1958 5,907  6,442 8,095 5,474 6,988 6,731  5,360 7,482 6,587 8,076 11,297 7,932
1959 6,051  6,608 8,561 5,753 7,116 7,176  5,653 7,736 6,865 8,279 11,870 8,208
1960 6,518  6,953 8,812 6,230 7,543 7,685  5,916 8,289 7,200 8,688 12,457 8,645
1961 6,826  7,253 9,307 6,658 7,880 7,932  6,372 8,203 7,573 9,137 13,099 8,857
1962 6,950  7,583 9,747 6,820 8,254 8,200  6,822 8,643 7,738 9,468 13,354 8,865
1963 7,187  7,863 9,731 6,994 8,535 8,363  7,255 8,834 7,978 9,917 13,710 9,149
1964 7,567  8,341 10,560 7,306 9,010 8,821  7,476 9,439 8,300 10,514 14,191 9,568
1965 7,734  8,523 10,956 7,669 9,362 9,185  7,580 9,797 8,677 10,815 14,504 9,752
1966 8,112  8,776 11,161 7,824 9,756 9,387  7,914 9,936 8,941 10,937 14,727 9,885
1967 8,297  9,071 11,436 7,946 10,128 9,397  8,416 10,341 9,429 11,218 15,010 10,049
1968 8,621  9,415 11,837 8,094 10,497 9,865  9,063 10,893 9,557 11,562 15,374 10,410
1969 9,131  10,018 12,525 8,877 11,135 10,440  9,527 11,462 9,904 12,055 16,031 10,552
1970 9,748  10,611 12,685 9,578 11,668 10,849  9,689 11,967 10,029 12,716 16,904 10,767
1971 10,199  10,969 12,934 9,765 12,118 11,078  9,827 12,319 10,424 12,749 17,382 10,937
1972 10,771  11,503 13,537 10,447 12,547 11,481  10,057 12,597 10,878 13,002 17,776 11,290
1973 11,235  12,170 13,945 11,085 13,123 11,966  10,643 13,082 11,246 13,493 18,204 12,022
1974 11,658  12,643 13,752 11,360 13,420 12,061  11,069 13,495 11,759 13,886 18,414 11,856
1975 11,646  12,441 13,621 11,440 13,266 12,041  10,767 13,367 12,181 14,184 17,223 11,845
1976 12,200  13,122 14,465 11,358 13,785 12,681  11,410 13,882 12,950 14,282 17,171 12,113
1977 12,767  13,190 14,657 11,354 14,235 13,071  11,690 14,174 13,357 14,005 17,636 12,381
1978 12,731  13,554 14,826 11,558 14,567 13,453  12,083 14,422 13,905 14,209 17,661 12,825
1979 13,449  13,861 15,313 12,331 14,970 13,989  12,731 14,643 14,460 14,721 18,050 13,164
1980 13,760  14,467 15,227 12,948 15,103 14,113  13,153 14,700 15,128 14,936 18,780 12,928
1981 13,710  14,276 15,095 13,134 15,173 14,146  13,198 14,524 15,221 14,917 18,946 12,754
1982 13,959  14,466 15,563 13,485 15,466 14,040  13,242 14,290 15,192 15,058 18,564 12,960
1983 14,367  14,457 15,967 13,766 15,567 14,329  13,392 14,478 15,680 15,315 18,614 13,406
1984 14,407  14,809 16,675 14,106 15,723 14,785  13,730 14,897 16,553 15,919 19,110 13,709
1985 14,717  14,946 17,383 14,521 15,869 15,143  14,110 15,286 17,362 16,201 19,676 14,148
1986 15,085  15,155 17,992 14,818 16,169 15,474  14,511 15,622 17,923 16,533 19,877 14,727
1987 15,319  15,493 18,023 15,381 16,495 15,701  14,960 15,738 18,200 16,996 19,884 15,386
1988 15,762  16,212 18,223 16,090 17,130 16,143  15,552 16,045 18,084 17,300 20,340 16,110
1989 16,368  16,738 18,267 16,940 17,728 16,551  15,988 16,699 18,173 17,593 21,303 16,404
1990 16,905  17,201 18,452 16,868 18,101 15,932  16,315 17,267 18,470 17,695 21,886 16,411
1991 17,250  17,479 18,662 15,677 18,190 16,604  16,535 17,517 18,952 17,380 21,430 16,096
1992 17,346  17,690 18,838 15,117 18,373 16,848  16,632 17,738 19,457 17,032 21,169 16,050
1993 17,197  17,361 18,931 14,873 18,119 16,544  16,606 17,747 19,873 16,556 20,876 16,367
1994 17,551  17,824 19,959 15,394 18,411 16,882  16,919 18,210 20,844 17,116 20,745 17,027
1995 17,876  18,219 20,603 15,918 18,656 17,123  17,376 18,526 21,537 17,655 20,785 17,440
1996 18,206  18,436 20,982 16,500 18,802 17,211  17,542 19,005 22,479 17,821 20,756 17,834
1997 18,462  19,048 21,526 17,496 19,096 17,417  17,853 19,636 23,400 18,181 21,057 18,395
1998 19,107  19,442 21,985 18,383 19,699 17,762  18,150 20,350 23,835 18,822 21,489 18,860
1999 19,608  19,978 22,417 19,058 20,269 18,074  18,432 20,976 23,922 19,652 21,735 19,223
2000 20,159  20,723 23,008 20,183 20,981 18,592  18,914 21,545 24,311 20,323 22,262 19,836
2001 20,287  20,905 23,135 20,269 21,291 18,670  19,205 21,714 24,520 20,514 22,424 20,066
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Annex Table 2. Sulfur emissions, 1850 to 1999 (in 1000 metric tons) 
Year  Austria Belgium Denmark  Finland France Germany Italy Netherlds. Norway Sweden Switzerl. UK 
1850 13 31 2 0 87 177 3 9 1 1 0 737
1851 16 34 2 0 89 198 3 9 1 2 0 796
1852 20 39 2 0 96 238 4 11 1 2 0 852
1853 24 40 2 0 113 235 5 12 1 2 0 906
1854 24 44 3 0 130 255 6 17 2 2 1 961
1855 27 46 3 0 148 290 6 13 2 3 1 960
1856 32 45 4 0 157 313 7 14 3 4 1 986
1857 37 47 5 1 162 311 8 12 3 5 1 945
1858 40 50 3 1 160 334 9 11 3 5 1 939
1859 43 51 4 1 163 352 10 10 3 6 2 1,041
1860 49 52 4 1 177 389 10 14 3 6 3 1,162
1861 55 56 5 1 190 432 11 13 4 8 4 1,210
1862 62 56 5 1 198 467 17 17 4 8 4 1,173
1863 63 59 5 1 201 481 16 12 4 8 4 1,245
1864 63 62 5 1 213 532 21 10 5 9 5 1,337
1865 70 65 7 1 225 561 18 11 5 9 6 1,414
1866 63 71 6 1 247 579 22 12 6 9 6 1,456
1867 79 78 6 1 250 625 27 12 6 9 6 1,493
1868 93 70 8 1 254 668 78 12 6 10 6 1,467
1869 102 75 7 1 261 711 112 13 6 10 6 1,536
1870 115 86 8 2 227 679 133 14 7 11 7 1,568
1871 143 82 8 2 226 704 89 15 7 12 9 1,658
1872 150 88 8 2 275 852 122 15 7 14 10 1,745
1873 165 99 8 2 295 893 117 15 8 14 10 1,835
1874 163 91 9 2 282 864 105 14 8 15 10 1,783
1875 162 95 10 2 295 900 102 16 10 17 11 1,879
1876 168 93 11 2 297 967 117 18 9 19 12 1,866
1877 169 91 11 2 290 1,024 137 18 11 19 12 1,881
1878 174 96 10 2 296 1,077 109 19 10 17 11 1,854
1879 195 98 12 2 308 1,122 125 21 11 17 12 1,860
1880 203 108 13 2 346 1,274 143 23 12 21 14 2,035
1881 218 109 14 2 356 1,379 138 23 12 21 13 2,134
1882 225 115 15 2 378 1,468 158 24 13 23 14 2,153
1883 243 123 17 2 398 1,539 169 26 13 23 16 2,238
1884 247 121 17 3 385 1,505 177 26 14 25 16 2,182
1885 259 119 18 3 369 1,560 187 28 15 27 17 2,155
1886 263 114 17 2 363 1,423 182 28 15 26 17 2,137
1887 278 121 18 2 381 1,517 188 29 15 27 19 2,191
1888 291 128 20 2 394 1,519 190 32 16 29 19 2,278
1889 308 131 21 3 401 1,621 199 31 18 33 22 2,359
1890 324 144 20 3 444 1,687 215 30 17 33 23 2,414
1891 344 137 22 3 446 1,725 204 35 19 35 30 2,465
1892 343 136 22 3 447 1,672 206 34 20 35 30 2,414
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Annex Table 2  (continued). Sulfur emissions, 1850 to 1999… 
Year  Austria Belgium Denmark  Finland France Germany Italy Netherlds. Norway Sweden Switzerl. UK 
1893 371 130 22 3 438 1,700 198 34 20 35 24 2,163
1894 383 144 25 3 464 1,713 225 35 22 39 31 2,476
1895 409 146 25 4 466 1,785 203 35 23 39 33 2,500
1896 425 153 33 4 480 1,943 190 37 23 40 36 2,572
1897 449 160 33 6 501 1,968 194 39 25 44 38 2,641
1898 466 164 34 6 514 2,000 198 38 25 46 41 2,646
1899 477 175 37 8 548 2,101 217 40 28 58 45 2,835
1900 505 186 37 7 602 2,198 214 44 29 59 50 2,870
1901 519 174 39 5 583 2,232 208 43 29 55 46 2,809
1902 506 183 40 5 551 2,198 222 43 30 56 46 2,917
1903 515 198 41 6 595 2,294 233 46 31 62 50 2,942
1904 534 203 45 6 583 2,376 241 49 31 66 53 2,956
1905 553 206 44 7 586 2,421 259 50 32 65 55 2,996
1906 605 237 48 7 653 2,568 300 55 33 73 62 3,105
1907 700 241 44 9 699 2,687 325 58 36 83 73 3,245
1908 869 223 54 14 701 2,662 326 59 41 89 73 3,164
1909 724 241 59 13 717 2,738 345 62 41 82 73 3,193
1910 860 257 54 11 719 2,888 349 64 42 84 70 3,220
1911 761 264 58 13 756 2,874 358 69 44 82 79 3,299
1912 793 279 69 15 758 3,122 376 78 48 91 80 3,130
1913 322 292 73 17 840 3,228 407 87 49 104 86 3,429
1914 249 218 73 8 590 2,880 371 82 54 98 79 3,325
1915 337 188 80 3 549 2,931 317 79 59 100 85 3,371
1916 288 202 78 4 587 3,382 323 73 57 107 83 3,496
1917 259 177 47 4 623 3,309 232 58 36 46 61 3,462
1918 223 157 48 4 567 3,091 270 50 41 54 58 3,228
1919 187 184 54 5 641 2,234 264 78 47 53 48 3,160
1920 157 206 67 6 895 2,185 270 79 49 76 78 3,258
1921 187 209 58 5 731 2,362 294 76 37 42 44 2,224
1922 181 223 81 9 878 1,918 336 90 53 69 61 2,977
1923 176 300 91 17 982 1,519 361 90 55 85 77 3,164
1924 195 317 104 19 1,061 1,888 423 100 59 100 72 3,316
1925 181 325 89 18 999 1,921 395 103 58 89 72 3,114
1926 169 308 82 16 983 1,757 426 102 50 79 66 1,734
1927 184 363 102 26 1,025 2,027 488 113 59 113 77 3,235
1928 190 347 94 29 1,005 2,134 438 116 62 100 77 3,023
1929 215 391 112 36 1,134 2,277 504 125 70 123 88 3,185
1930 170 374 105 31 1,150 1,966 450 124 66 119 82 3,048
1931 157 329 106 36 1,028 1,671 370 135 53 117 83 2,847
1932 133 264 102 38 896 1,509 302 125 65 120 85 2,742
1933 127 275 101 40 935 1,580 325 116 70 129 83 2,716
1934 121 282 106 50 938 1,753 425 116 73 139 82 2,930
1935 121 266 108 54 901 1,926 483 109 73 145 80 2,969
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Annex Table 2 (continued). Sulfur emissions, 1850 to 1999... 
Year  Austria  Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy  Netherlds. Norway Sweden Switzerl. UK 
1936 117 279 116 64 915 2,116 331 117 78 159 81 3,136
1937 132 340 118 78 1,029 2,384 461 129 81 180 87 3,235
1938 130 291 109 67 931 2,537 456 126 76 163 83 3,096
1939 139 310 132 66 913 2,777 491 136 88 198 108 3,147
1940 143 280 85 50 620 2,820 520 131 56 130 73 3,304
1941 141 297 85 62 494 2,896 460 143 50 113 57 3,244
1942 143 291 84 60 514 2,955 455 137 48 104 50 3,241
1943 147 288 107 74 537 3,019 396 141 53 122 52 3,144
1944 145 210 105 56 354 2,643 311 108 47 98 37 3,066
1945 103 238 66 33 473 443 272 83 34 40 7 2,899
1946 114 309 123 54 761 1,294 256 114 57 128 51 3,014
1947 165 337 155 77 912 1,489 453 138 77 184 91 3,181
1948 212 327 126 104 965 1,736 405 140 74 215 90 3,236
1949 222 302 136 71 1,100 1,982 424 153 69 186 71 3,324
1950 181 233 80 60 953 2,172 467 187 29 126 41 3,396
1951 208 293 113 85 1,147 2,489 661 212 38 144 61 3,726
1952 195 308 104 89 1,204 2,626 661 220 26 134 48 3,772
1953 189 306 87 78 1,117 2,702 746 222 24 115 34 3,756
1954 210 312 88 81 1,159 2,792 830 239 23 109 42 3,813
1955 237 318 107 96 1,147 3,069 905 255 24 119 45 3,924
1956 250 362 88 105 1,287 3,250 951 276 23 109 60 3,903
1957 257 366 101 122 1,294 3,308 974 269 22 116 66 3,878
1958 219 363 88 121 1,263 3,281 916 250 19 97 43 3,805
1959 202 325 87 135 1,197 3,164 924 240 18 99 41 3,689
1960 208 305 108 146 1,168 3,336 1,019 263 20 105 47 3,503
1961 195 300 110 147 1,159 3,452 1,080 257 32 101 40 3,461
1962 203 309 123 149 1,162 3,551 1,175 270 37 100 41 3,588
1963 225 383 135 150 1,255 3,702 1,290 282 37 98 56 3,507
1964 219 378 134 154 1,299 3,838 1,332 282 39 105 45 3,515
1965 206 375 128 151 1,306 3,708 1,469 269 38 98 42 3,458
1966 200 351 140 140 1,304 3,595 1,611 261 37 98 49 3,280
1967 189 341 145 155 1,364 3,429 1,758 257 40 116 64 3,309
1968 190 376 147 170 1,327 3,487 1,821 258 52 141 67 3,212
1969 180 384 145 185 1,338 3,584 1,854 275 54 153 66 3,008
1970 199 395 147 230 1,432 3,748 2,035 295 60 164 68 2,921
1971 194 358 123 210 1,393 3,711 1,970 266 56 161 61 3,028
1972 204 388 114 203 1,369 3,612 1,925 273 59 149 52 2,589
1973 208 393 125 210 1,451 3,633 2,028 287 62 148 65 2,742
1974 214 392 139 236 1,538 3,620 2,098 280 66 169 71 2,488
1975 197 339 136 236 1,366 3,505 1,731 239 63 175 50 2,650
1976 195 334 129 222 1,415 3,565 1,696 253 73 196 43 2,510
1977 188 381 153 268 1,491 3,542 1,867 255 75 201 48 2,411
1978 191 348 156 248 1,423 3,433 1,789 228 71 205 43 2,365
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Annex Table 2  (continued). Sulfur emissions, 1850 to 1999... 
Year  Austria  Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy  Netherlds. Norway Sweden Switzerl. UK 
1979 208 387 190 278 1,584 3,682 1,933 253 72 219 51 2,343
1980 192 414 226 292 1,606 3,757 1,879 245 69 246 58 2,440
1981 167 356 185 267 1,262 3,721 1,665 232 64 216 54 2,213
1982 158 347 189 242 1,207 3,720 1,425 202 55 186 50 2,107
1983 119 280 161 186 992 3,673 1,232 162 52 153 46 1,937
1984 106 250 153 184 885 3,817 1,057 150 48 148 42 1,856
1985 95 200 172 191 740 3,866 951 129 49 133 38 1,875
1986 86 189 146 166 672 3,821 965 132 46 136 34 1,955
1987 76 184 129 164 665 3,698 1,015 132 37 114 31 1,954
1988 58 177 127 151 610 3,244 982 125 34 112 28 1,920
1989 51 163 99 122 690 3,083 927 102 29 80 25 1,860
1990 46 186 91 130 639 2,661 826 101 26 60 21 1,877
1991 41 167 121 97 695 1,998 770 87 22 48 21 1,784
1992 32 159 94 71 606 1,654 697 86 18 44 19 1,724
1993 30 149 77 62 526 1,473 667 82 18 44 17 1,553
1994 29 127 78 57 495 1,237 636 73 17 41 16 1,333
1995 28 123 74 48 467 997 661 74 17 40 17 1,174
1996 26 120 90 53 457 703 603 68 17 42 15 1,005
1997 25 110 55 50 384 564 538 59 15 26 13 819
1998 23 106 38 45 404 450 520 54 15 25 14 784
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Annex Table 3. Key Dates for Sulfur Relevant Legislation in the UK. 
Year  Regulation  
1821  Smoke prohibition act. Tried to encourage the prosecution of a public nuisance from smoke. 
1845  Railway Clauses Consolidated Act Engines to consume their own smoke. 
1847  Improvement Clauses act Reduce factory smoke. 
1853  London Act. Penalties against smoke nuisance. 
1863  Alkali Act. Regulate alkali trade – condense at least 95% hydrochloric acid gas. 
1866  Sanitary Act. Authorities empowered to take action in cases of smoke nuisances. 
1874  Other noxious gases added to Alkali Act. 
1875  Public Health Act 
1906  Alkali etc. Works Regulation Act 
1926  Smoke Abatement Act 
1953  Grit came under control of Alkali inspectors. Reduce emissions to 0.5 grains per 
cubic foot and install precipitators. 
1955 Environment  Act.  Became law in 1956. 7 years to re-equip, 10 years later, industry 
had reduced emissions 74%. 
1956  Clean Air Act. “Subject to the provisions of this Act, dark smoke shall not be emitted 
from a chimney of any building, and if, on any day, smoke is so emitted the occupier 
of the building shall be guilty of an offence.” Section 1. Dark smoke is one whose 
color is equal to or darker than shade 2 of the Ringlemann Chart – a subjective 
measure. (Manning 1993 chap. 3) Smokeless zones allowed – not instituted until 
1960. 
1968  Clean Air Act. Taller chimneys for more dispersement. 
1974  Control of Pollution Act. Allows for the making of regulations imposing requirements 
on vehicle fuel regulations could be made for sulfur content of oil in furnaces and 
engines. 
1979  Convention on Long Range Transboundary Pollution 
1980  Directive 80/779 on limit values for sulfur dioxide and suspended particulates: OJ 
1980 No. L229/30.  
Over a year, the average level of black smoke (or fine particulates) cannot exceed 
eighty micrograms per cubic meter. The level of sulfur dioxide is dependant on 
the concentration of smoke. If there are less than or equal to forty micrograms 
per cubic meter of black smoke, the amount of sulfur dioxide cannot exceed 120 
micrograms per cubic meter. When the amount of smoke exceeds forty 
micrograms per cubic meter, then the top limit of sulfur dioxide is reduced to 
eighty micrograms per cubic meter. Similar standards are set for wintertime (18) 
and peak concentrations (19). (Manning chap. 4) 
1985  Helsinki Protocol on Reduction of Sulfur emissions. Reduce by 30% by 1993 
compared to 1980 levels (Europa link) 
1988  Sofia Protocol on Nitrogen Oxide. Reduce emissions by 1994 compared to 1987 
levels. Apply national emissions standards to mobile sources and introduce pollution 
control measures for major stationary sources. (Europa link) 
   25
 
  
Annex Table 3 (continued). Key Dates for Sulfur Relevant Legislation in the UK. 
Year  Regulation  
1988  EC Directive on large combustion plant. 
•  Power stations to reduce emissions of Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxide. 
•  UK to reduce SO2 by 60% of 1980 levels by 2003.  
•  NO by 30% of 1980 levels by 1998. 
•  UK Stated target of 30% for Sulfur was an ‘aim of policy’ Manning 1993 chap. 4 
1989  Air Quality Standards Regulations (S.I. 1989 No. 317). 
•  One year:  limit SO2 to 120 microg/m
3 if smoke less than 40 microg/m
3 
(median of daily values) 80 microg/m
3 if smoke more than 40. 
•  Winter: 180 if smoke less than 60 
(median of winter values) 130 if smoke more than 60 
•  Year, peak 350 if smoke less than 150 
•  (98 percentile of daily values)  250 if smoke more than 150 
•  From Leeson 1995: 229-230: these figures are the same as for Directive 80/779.  
•  Other EC directives to go into effect in the Air Quality Standards Regulations are 
82/884/EEC (lead), 85/203/EEC (nitrogen dioxide) and 92/72/EEC (ozone) 
1990 Environmental  Protection  Act.  Integrated Pollution control. Regulates statutory 
nuisances i.e. something prejudicial to health or a nuisance at common law. (Handler 
ed. 58) 
1990  Large Combustion plant national plan. Reduction targets for SO2 at 60% of 1980 
levels by 2003. 
1992  Directive 91/441/EEC (see SI 1992 No. 2137). Limits emissions of carbon monoxide, 
hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen from new passenger and light goods vehicles. 
1993 Directive  93/59/EEC.  Limits emissions from new light commercial vehicles and vans 
(see McEldowney and McEldowney page 269 for further directives limiting vehicular 
emissions). 
1993  Clean Air Act. Consolidation of 1955 and 1963 Acts. 
1993  Stubble burning banned. 
1994  Second Protocol on Reduction of Suphur Emissions (Oslo Protocol) 
•  W. Europe to reduce 70-80% if 1980 levels 
•  E. Europe to reduce to 40-50% 
1995  Environment Act (came into practice 1997 NAQA) 
1997   National Air Quality Strategy. Standards and Objectives for CO, NO2, SO2, 
particulates, ozone, lead, benzene and 1,3- butadene.  Guideline and more serious 
alert thresholds. Government adopted the standard of 100ppb at 99.9% compliance. 
(electricity.org) 
1999 Gothenburg  Protocol. Emissions ceilings for sulfur, NOx, VOC, and ammonia. Sulfur 
should be cut by at least 63%, NOx by 41%,  VOC by 40% and ammonia by 17% 




   26
 
Annex Table 4. Key European Legislation Relevant to Sulfur Emissions. 
Year  Regulation  
1972  Environmental Action Programme 
1979  Convention on Long Range Transboundary Pollution 
1980 Directive  80/779 on limit values for sulfur dioxide and suspended particulates: OJ 
1980 No. L229/30. Over a year, the average level of black smoke (or fine 
particulates) cannot exceed eighty micrograms per cubic meter. The level of sulfur 
dioxide is dependant on the concentration of smoke. If there are less than or equal to 
forty micrograms per cubic meter of black smoke, the amount of sulfur dioxide 
cannot exceed 120 micrograms per cubic meter. When the amount of smoke exceeds 
forty micrograms per cubic meter, then the top limit of sulfur dioxide is reduced to 
eighty micrograms per cubic meter. Similar standards are set for wintertime … and 
peak concentrations. (Manning chap. 4) 
1985  Helsinki Protocol on Reduction of Sulfur emissions.  Reduce by 30% by 1993 
compared to 1980 levels (Europa link) 
1988  Sofia Protocol on Nitrogen Oxide. Reduce emissions by 1994 compared to 1987 
levels. Apply national emissions standards to mobile sources and introduce pollution 
control measures for major stationary sources. (Europa link) 
1988  EC Directive on large combustion plant. Power stations required to reduce emissions 
of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide. 
1989  Air Quality Standards Regulations (S.I. 1989 No. 317) 
1992  Directive 91/441/EEC (see SI 1992 No. 2137). Limits emissions of carbon monoxide, 
hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen from new passenger and light goods vehicles. 
1993 Directive  93/59/EEC.  Limits emissions from new light commercial vehicles and vans 
(see McEldowney and McEldowney page 269 for further directives limiting vehicular 
emissions) 
1994  Second Protocol on Reduction of Suphur Emissions (Oslo Protocol) 
•  W. Europe to reduce 70-80% if 1980 levels 
•  E. Europe to reduce to 40-50% 
1999 Gothenburg  Protocol.  Emissions ceilings for sulphur, NOx, VOC, and ammonia. 
Sulfur should be cut by at least 63%, NOx by 41%,  VOC by 40% and ammonia by 
17% compared to 1990. 
1999  Directive on sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, particulate 
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